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This paper presents a game semantics for LP, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs. The
language of LP extends that of propositional logic by adding formula-labeling terms,
permitting us to take a term t and an LP formula A and form the new formula t :A.
We define a game semantics for this logic that interprets terms as winning strategies
on the formulas they label, so t :A may be read as “t is a winning strategy on A.” LP
may thus be seen as a logic containing in-language descriptions of winning strategies
on its own formulas.
We apply our semantics to show how winnable instances of certain extensive games
with perfect information may be embedded into LP. This allows us to use LP to derive
a winning strategy on the embedding, from which we can extract a winning strategy
on the original, non-embedded game. As a concrete illustration of this method, we
compute a winning strategy for a winnable instance of the well-known game Nim.
1 Introduction
Propositional Verification is a game played by two players, who we call True and False. The
game requires two input parameters: a formula A in the language of propositional logic and
a background model M that interprets atomic formulas. To play the game, the players begin
on the formula A and take turns choosing an immediate subformula instance of the current
formula, with True choosing at positive subformula instances of A and False choosing at
negative subformula instances of A. Eventually an atomic formula p is reached, at which
point the game is over. True wins in two cases: (1) p is true in M and positive in A, and (2)
p is false in M and negative in A. False wins exactly when True loses.
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Propositional Verification can be used to define a notion of truth for propositional for-
mulas: to say A is true means that for every model M interpreting atomic formulas, True
has a winning strategy in the Propositional Verification Game on A with background model
M . In this context, a strategy is just a function that specifies the choices True should make
when it is his turn to move, and a winning strategy is a strategy that True can follow so as
to guarantee himself a win, no matter the moves of False. Identifying the true formulas as
those for which True has a winning strategy in Propositional Verification gives us a game
semantics for classical propositional logic.
Propositional Verification may be extended to the language of first-order logic, yielding a
First-Order Verification Game.1 Hintikka and Sandu introduced partial information exten-
sions of First-Order Verification in order to provide a semantics for Independence-Friendly
(or IF ) logic, a logic that allows for arbitrary dependencies between quantifiers and logical
connectives in a first-order language [9]. Research in IF logics has centered on identifying
these dependencies and understanding their influences on logic (see Sandu’s paper [14] for a
flavor of this work, along with his papers [13, 15] for an impression of IF logic applications
in linguistics).
Verification games have been used to provide semantics for many other logics, including
intuitionistic logic and modal logic (see Hodges’ overview of games in logic [10]).
In this paper, we define a game semantics for the logic LP, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [4].
LP is a conservative extension of classical propositional logic with a language obtained from
that of propositional logic by adding formula-labeling terms. If t is such a term and A is an
LP formula, then t :A is also an LP formula. Terms have a structure that mimics deduction
in the system in the sense of Artemov’s Internalization Theorem: each LP theorem A has a
term t such that t :A is also an LP theorem [4]. It is in this sense we say that LP internalizes
its theorems—thereby providing a reason for each theorem’s veracity—leading us to the
informal reading of t :A as “A for reason t.” This in-language notion of justification has
led to various multi-modal extensions of LP, which have been used as logics of multi-agent
knowledge with reasons. These logics are now grouped under the name Justification Logic
[2, 3, 1].
This paper defines a game semantics for the most basic Justification Logic, LP itself.
Our game semantics adds to the list of known semantics for LP, which presently include an
arithmetic semantics [4], a minimal semantics, [11], and a Kripke-style semantics [6]. We
define this game semantics by extending Propositional Verification to the language of LP,
interpreting LP terms as winning strategies on the formulas they label. We may thus assign
to the LP formula t :A the informal reading “t is a winning strategy on A.”
Since terms are interpreted as winning strategies in LP Verification, the LP Internalization
Theorem implies that winning strategies in LP Verification can be described within the LP
Verification Game itself. We will use this in the end of the paper to show how the existence
of a winning-strategy–preserving embedding of certain extensive games G of with perfect
information into Propositional Verification (and hence into LP Verification) allows us to
use the Internalization Theorem to build a winning strategy on the embedded version of a
1The basic ideas of this extension go back to Peirce [12].
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winnable G-instance, from which we can then extract a winning strategy on the original, non-
embedded G-instance itself. For concreteness, we provide an example strategy extraction for
the well-known game of Nim [5].
But before we can do this, we must describe LP and its game semantics. So let us begin
by introducing LP, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [4].
2 The Language and Theory of LP
For present purposes, the language of propositional logic consists of a countable number of
propositional variables, the propositional constant > for truth, the propositional constant ⊥
for falsehood, and the logical connective ⊃ for implication. The atoms, also called atomic
formulas, consist of the propositional letters and the propositional constants. The proposi-
tional formulas are obtained from the atoms by closure under the following rule of formula
formation: if A and B are propositional formulas, then A ⊃ B is also a propositional for-
mula. A propositional formula written using other logical connectives is understood as an
abbreviation for the appropriate formula in this language.
The language of LP is obtained from that of propositional logic by adding a countable
number of constant symbols, a countable number of variable symbols, the binary function
symbols + and ·, and the unary function symbol !. The atomic terms consist of the constants
and the variables. Terms are built-up from the atomic terms using the function symbols.
Notation. The letters t, u, and v will be used as metavariables ranging over terms.
The LP formulas are obtained from the propositional formulas by closure under both the
rule of propositional formula formation and also the following rule: if A is an LP formula
and t is a term, then t :A is also an LP formula. In the remainder of the paper, unqualified
use of the word formula refers to an LP formula.
Notation. Use of letters as metavariables:
• A, B, C, and D will be used for formulas.
• p will be used for atoms (propositional letters, >, or ⊥).
Definition 2.1. A term-labeled formula is a formula of the form t :A.
Definition 2.2. The theory of LP is given by the following axiom schemas and rules of
inference.
• Axiom Schemas
LP0. Axiom schemas for classical propositional logic
LP1. t : (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (s :A ⊃ (t · s) :B)
LP2. t :A ⊃ !t : (t :A)
LP3. t :A ⊃ (t + s) :A
s :A ⊃ (t + s) :A
LP4. t :A ⊃ A
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• Rules of Inference
– The rule of Modus Ponens :
A A ⊃ B
B
– The rule of Constant Necessitation:
c is a constant, A is an LP axiom
c :A
Theorem 2.3 (Artemov’s Internalization Theorem [4]). Each LP theorem A has a term t
such that t :A is also an LP theorem. Further, the term t does not contain variables.
Proof. By induction on the length of a derivation of A. In case A is an axiom, then, letting c
be a constant, c :A is an LP theorem. Otherwise, A is obtained by Modus Ponens or Constant
Necessitation. If A is obtained from the theorems B and B ⊃ A by Modus Ponens, then
the induction hypothesis yields terms u and v such that v :B and u : (B ⊃ A) are both
theorems, and so it follows from LP1 and Modus Ponens that (u · v) :A is a theorem. If c :A
is obtained by Constant Necessitation, it follows from LP2 and Modus Ponens that !c : (c :A)
is a theorem.
3 Strategies and Strategy Maps
Before we introduce the LP Verification Game, we must first describe our notion of strategy
for a formula. Since we will assign a strategy to each term occurring in a formula, we need
a means of simultaneously specifying all of these assignments. A strategy map is a function
that does this for us. But before we can define a strategy map, we first need some basic
definitions.
Definition 3.1. The construction tree of A, written T (A), is the labeled binary tree con-
structed as follows:
• the root is labeled A;
• each node labeled B ⊃ C has two children: a left child labeled B and a right child
labeled C; and
• each node labeled t :B has one child: a right child labeled B.
Definition 3.2. A path in a tree T is a sequence n1, n2, n3, . . . , nk of nodes such that n1 is
the root of T and, for each i < k, the node ni+1 is a child of ni. A path is said to end on
the node n iff n is the last node in the sequence.
Definition 3.3.
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Figure 1. A formula construction tree. The choice points are marked by a check (X) and the response
points are marked by a dagger (†). Recall the child-naming convention from Definition 3.1: if a node has
exactly one child, then this child is a right child.
• A subformula instance of A is a node in T (A).
• A subformula instance n of A is immediate iff n is a child of the root of T (A).
• A subformula instance n of A is positive iff the path in T (A) ending on n contains the
left child of an even number of nodes.
• A subformula instance n of A is negative iff n is not positive.
• To say that the subformula instances n1 and n2 of A have the same polarity means
that n1 is positive iff n2 is positive.
• The subformula instances n1 and n2 of A have opposite polarity iff n1 and n2 do not
have the same polarity.
• A subformula instance n of A is term-labeled iff the formula labeling n is term-labeled.
• When referring to a formula B as a subformula instance of A, the referent is a subfor-
mula instance n of A (so n is a node in T (A)) that is labeled by B. The adjectives
immediate, positive, and negative have their corresponding meaning when applied to a
formula B that is a subformula instance of A.
Definition 3.4. A choice point of A is a non-leaf positive subformula instance of A that
does not have a positive term-labeled ancestor.
Definition 3.5. A response point of A is a non-leaf negative subformula instance of A that
does not have a negative term-labeled ancestor.
Example 3.6. Figure 1 indicates the choice points and response points in a complicated
construction tree.
Example 3.7. The only choice point of t :A is the root of T (t :A).
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Definition 3.8. A strategy on A is a function mapping each choice point B of A to an
immediate subformula instance of B.
Definition 3.9. A counter-strategy on A is a function mapping each response point B of A
to an immediate subformula instance of B.
Notation. Suppose that s∗ is a strategy on A, that s∗ is a counter-strategy on A, that B
−
is a response point of A, and that C+ is a choice point of A.
• s∗ B− is the counter-strategy on B− that maps each response point D of B− to the
immediate subformula instance s∗(D) of D.
• s∗ C+ is the strategy on C+ that maps each choice point D of C+ to the immediate
subformula instance s∗(D) of D.
• s∗ B− is the strategy on B− that maps each choice point D of B− to the immediate
subformula instance s∗(D) of D.
• s∗ C+ is the counter-strategy on C+ that maps each response point D of C+ to the
immediate subformula instance s∗(D) of D.
Definition 3.10. We will call the function with empty domain both the trivial strategy and
also the trivial counter-strategy.
Remark 3.11. The trivial strategy is a strategy on any formula that does not have choice
points, and the trivial counter-strategy is a counter-strategy on any formula that does not
have response points. For example: the trivial strategy is a strategy on each atom p; the
trivial counter-strategy is a counter-strategy on each atom p.
Definition 3.12. A possible strategy map is a partial function S that maps the term-formula
pair (t, A) to a strategy S(t, A) on A. Notation: S(t, A)↓ means (t, A) is in the domain of
S, and S(t, A)↑ means (t, A) is not in the domain of S.
Definition 3.13. A possible strategy map S is axiomatically saturated iff S(c, A)↓ for each
constant c and axiom A.
Remark 3.14. It is sometimes convenient to restrict the rule of Constant Necessitation,
thereby yielding a weaker theory. While our present task is to define a semantics for the
full theory of LP, which allows unrestricted use of the rule of Constant Necessitation, our
semantics will work just as well for these weaker theories if one appropriately redefines the
meaning of axiomatically saturated, Definition 3.13. Namely, if we impose a restriction R on
the use of the rule of Constant Necessitation, we would then call the possible strategy map
S axiomatically saturated iff S(c, A)↓ whenever c :A is derivable via the rule of Constant
Necessitation with restriction R. With this modified definition of axiomatically saturated,
the work of the paper could then be carried out as-is.
Definition 3.15. A strategy map is a possible strategy map S that satisfies each of the
following conditions:
6
1. Product. If S(u, A ⊃ B)↓ and S(v, A)↓, then both
(a) S(u · v, B) = S(u, A ⊃ B)B, and
(b) S(u, C ⊃ B)↓ and S(v, C)↓ implies S(u, C ⊃ B)B = S(u, A ⊃ B)B.
2. Proof Checker. S(t, A)↓ implies S(!t, t :A)↓.
3. Sum.
(a) S(t, A)↓ implies S(t + u, A) = S(t, A).
(b) S(t, A)↑ and S(u, A)↓ implies S(t + u, A) = S(u, A).
Remark 3.16. Condition 1b in the definition of strategy map (Definition 3.15) ensures that
S is well-defined on term-formula pairs whose term is of the form u · v. This condition is
otherwise unused.
Definition 3.17. Suppose that n1 and n2 are each ancestors of a node n in the tree T (A).
n1 is nearer to n than n2 iff the length of the path in T (A) ending on n1 is greater than the
length of the path in T (A) ending on n2. The ancestors of n are linearly ordered by this
notion of nearness.
Definition 3.18. Let S be a strategy map. A path n1, n2, n3, . . . , nk of T (A) is S-admissible
iff for each i < k, we have each of the following:
• if ni is labeled t :B and S(t, B)↑, then i = k;
• if ni is positive and ni has a positive term-labeled ancestor, then, letting u :C be the
label of ni’s nearest positive term-labeled ancestor, we have ni+1 = S(u, C)(ni); and
• if ni is negative and ni has a negative term-labeled ancestor, then, letting v :D be the
label of ni’s nearest negative term-labeled ancestor, we have ni+1 = S(v, D)(ni).
Definition 3.19. Let S be a strategy map, let A∗ be a strategy on A, let A∗ be a counter-
strategy on A, and let n1, n2, n3, . . . , nk be a path in T (A).
• This path is in accordance with the strategy A∗ iff the path is S-admissible and we
have ni+1 = A
∗(ni) for each choice point ni of A.
• This path is in accordance with the counter-strategy A∗ iff the path is S-admissible
and we have ni+1 = A∗(ni) for each response point ni of A.
Definition 3.20. Given a strategy map S, a play of a formula A is an S-admissible path in
T (A) of maximal length. Notation: if τ is a play of A and B occurs along τ , then τ B is
the play of B obtained from τ by deleting those nodes not in T (B).
Lemma 3.21 (Play Lemma). Let S be a strategy map. If A∗ is a strategy on A and A∗ is
a counter-strategy on A, then there is a unique play τ of T (A) such that τ is in accordance
with A∗ and with A∗.
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Proof. To construct τ , we produce a sequence n1, n2, n3, . . . , nk of nodes in T (A). First, let
n1 be the root of T (A). Once ni has been specified, if we have either that ni is a leaf or else
that ni is labeled v :C with S(v, C)↑, then we are done. Otherwise, ni is a non-leaf, and we
specify a child ni+1 of ni according to the following case analysis.
• Case: ni is a choice point of A.
Set ni+1 := A
∗(ni).
• Case: ni is a response point of A.
Set ni+1 := A∗(ni).
• Case: ni is neither a choice point of A nor a response point of A.
Let u :B be the nearest term-labeled ancestor of n that has the same polarity as n and
then set ni+1 := S(u, B)(ni).
Each node in T (A) is either a choice point, a response point, or else has a nearest term-
labeled ancestor of the same polarity. Therefore, these three cases are mutually exclusive
and exhaust all possibilities. Further, one may argue by induction on i that
• the path n1, n2, n3, . . . , ni is in accordance with A∗ and with A∗, and
• if ni is a non-leaf and it is not the case that ni is labeled v :C with S(v, C)↑, then ni
satisfies one of the three construction cases.
It follows that the construction indeed specifies a play τ of T (A) in accordance with A∗ and
with A∗. The uniqueness of τ follows from the fact that any play τ
′ in T (A) in accordance
with A∗ and with A∗ must also be built using this construction, so τ
′ = τ .
4 Truth
Now that we have seen how a strategy, a counter-strategy, and a strategy map work together
to specify a unique play of each formula, we introduce a model that interprets atomic formu-
las. Since our atoms are propositional letters and propositional constants, we take a rather
simple model: the set of atoms that are true in the model.
Definition 4.1. A valuation set is any set obtained as a union of {>} with a (possibly
empty) set of propositional letters.
In our description in the introduction of the Propositional Verification Game on A, we
described how the first player (“True”) wins on an atom p in one of two cases: (1) p is true
in the background model and positive in the formula A, and (2) p is false in the background
model and negative in the formula A. The next definition provides a name both for atoms
that match one of these two cases and also for atoms that match neither of these two cases.
We then define the notion of winning (counter-)strategy.
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Definition 4.2. Given a valuation set V , to say that a leaf n of T (A) is matching in A
means that n is positive iff the label of n is in V . If a leaf is not matching in A, it is called
mismatching in A.
Definition 4.3 (Winning Strategies, Winning Counter-Strategies). Let V be a valuation
set and S be a strategy map.
• A a strategy A∗ on a formula A is winning iff for each play τ of T (A) in accordance
with A∗, the end of τ is either a negative non-leaf or else a leaf matching in A.
• A counter-strategy A∗ on A is winning iff for each play τ of T (A) in accordance with
A∗, the end of τ is either a positive non-leaf or else a leaf mismatching in A.
Given a valuation set V and a strategy map S, we may think of a play of A as a path
in T (A) chosen during the LP Verification Game on A. As before, the first player (“True”)
moves on positive subformula instances and the second player (“False”) moves on negative
subformula instances. A player’s move consists of choosing an immediate subformula instance
of the current formula, subject to the restriction that the path in T (A) ending on the chosen
node is S-admissible. Notice that a play may end on a non-leaf n—this happens when n is a
term-labeled formula t :B with S(t, B)↑ (Definition 3.20)—so a player is sometimes unable to
make a move. The game ends when a player cannot make a move or when a leaf is reached;
that is, the game ends when a play of A has been constructed. The first player wins iff a
leaf matching in A is reached or the second player is unable to make a move, and the second
player wins iff a leaf mismatching in A is reached or the first player is unable to move.
A strategy tells the first player how he should move on those positive subformula instances
in which a certain move is not forced upon him by the S-admissibility constraint. Similarly,
a counter-strategy tells the second player how he should move at those negative subformula
instances where his move is not forced by S-admissibility. Thus a winning strategy on A
is just a strategy that guarantees the first player a win in the LP Verification Game on A.
Likewise, a winning counter-strategy on A guarantees the second player a win in this game.
We will use the existence of a winning strategy to define a notion of truth for the formula
A: call A true exactly when the first player (“True”) always has a winning strategy in the LP
Verification Game on A. Similarly, A is called false exactly when the second player (“False”)
always has a winning counter-strategy in this game. The remainder of this section sets out
the formal details of these definitions and shows that they provide a well-behaved notion of
truth for LP formulas. In particular, we now show that no formula is both true and false.
Lemma 4.4 (Win-Loss Lemma). Let V be a valuation set and S be a strategy map.
• If A∗ is a winning strategy on A, then no counter-strategy A∗ on A is winning.
• If B∗ is a winning counter-strategy on B, then no strategy B∗ on B is winning.
Proof. Assume that A∗ is a winning strategy on A. Given a counter-strategy A∗ on A, the
Play Lemma (Lemma 3.21) then yields a unique play τ of T (A) that is in accordance with
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A∗ and with A∗. It follows from the meaning of a winning strategy that τ ends either on a
negative non-leaf or else on a leaf matching in A, so A∗ is not a winning counter-strategy on
A. This completes the proof of the first item. The second item is proved similarly.
So while no formula may be both true and false, it might be the case that some formula
might not be assigned a truth value at all. The next lemma eliminates this possibility by
showing that every formula is indeed assigned a truth value.
Lemma 4.5 (Determinacy Lemma). Given a valuation set V and a strategy map S, each
formula A has either a winning strategy or else a winning counter-strategy.
Proof. This lemma is a special case of the Gale-Stewart Theorem [7] (see Hodges’ exposition
[10]), but it is useful for us to prove the result directly. Let us proceed.
It follows from the Win-Loss Lemma (Lemma 4.4) that a formula A cannot have both a
winning strategy and a winning counter-strategy, so we only need show that each formula
A has at least one of the two. Accordingly, we prove by induction on formula construction
that each formula has a winning strategy or a winning counter-strategy.
1. Base case: the formula is an atom p.
A strategy on p is winning iff p ∈ V , and a counter-strategy on p is winning iff p /∈ V .
Since we have either that p ∈ V or that p /∈ V , the result follows.
2. Inductive case: the formula is an implication B ⊃ C.
Let us first prove two claims.
(a) Claim: if there is a winning counter-strategy on B or a winning strategy on C,
then there is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C.
i. Case: B∗ is a winning counter-strategy on B.
Let s∗ be the strategy that chooses the immediate subformula instance B of
B ⊃ C and thereafter acts according to B∗; that is, let s∗(B ⊃ C) = B,
let s∗  B = B∗, and let s∗  C be an arbitrary strategy on C. If τ is a
play of B ⊃ C in accordance with s∗, it follows that τ  B is a play of B in
accordance with B∗. Since B∗ is a winning counter-strategy on B, we have
that τ B ends either on a positive term-labeled subformula instance of B or
else on a leaf mismatching in B. But a negative subformula instance of B is
a positive subformula instance of B ⊃ C, and so it follows that τ ends either
on a negative term-labeled subformula instance of B ⊃ C or else on a leaf
matching in B ⊃ C. Since τ was an arbitrary play of B ⊃ C in accordance
with s∗, it follows that s∗ is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C.
ii. Case: C∗ is a winning strategy on C.
Let s∗ be the strategy such that s∗(B ⊃ C) = C, that s∗ C = C∗, and that
s∗ B is an arbitrary counter-strategy on B. Since C∗ is a winning strategy
on C, it follows that s∗ is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C by an argument like
that in the previous case.
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(b) Claim: if there is a winning strategy on B and a winning counter-strategy on C,
then there is a winning counter-strategy on B ⊃ C.
Suppose that B∗ is a winning strategy on B and C∗ is a winning counter-strategy
on C. Define the counter-strategy s∗ on B ⊃ C by setting s∗  B = B∗ and
s∗  C = C∗. By an argument analogous to those in the cases of the previous
claim, it follows that s∗ is a winning counter-strategy on B ⊃ C.
Now that these claims have been proven, we apply the induction hypothesis: there
is either a winning strategy on B or else a winning counter-strategy on B, and there
is either a winning strategy on C or else a winning counter-strategy on C. It then
follows from the claims that there is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C or a winning
counter-strategy on B ⊃ C, which is what we wished to show.
3. Inductive case: the formula is the term-labeled formula t :B.
We consider three cases.
(a) Case: S(t, B)↓ and S(t, B) is a winning strategy on B.
Let s∗ be the strategy on t :B given by s∗(t :B) = B. Since S(t, B) is a winning
strategy on B, it follows that s∗ is a winning strategy on t :B.
(b) Case: S(t, B)↓ but S(t, B) is not a winning strategy on B.
If S(t, B) is not a winning strategy on B, then there is a play τ of t :B such
that the play τ  B of B is in accordance with S(t, B) and τ ends either on a
positive term-labeled formula or else on a leaf mismatching in t :B. Let s∗ be the
counter-strategy on t :B that maps each response point n in τ to the child of n in
τ and otherwise maps each response point n not in τ to an arbitrary child of n.
It follows that if a play τ ′ of t :B is in accordance with s∗, then τ
′ = τ , and so s∗
is a winning counter-strategy on t :B.
(c) Case: S(t, B)↑.
In this case, every play of t :B ends on the positive subformula instance t :B and
thus any counter-strategy on t :B is winning.
Since these cases exhaust all possibilities, there is a winning strategy on t :B or a
winning counter-strategy on t :B, which is what we wished to show.
It was our intention to assign to the formula t :A the the informal reading “t is a winning
strategy on A.” The following definition classifies the strategy maps that make good on this
intention.
Definition 4.6. A strategy map S is good for a valuation set V iff S(t, A)↓ implies that
S(t, A) is a winning strategy on A.
To complete our definition of truth, we want to make sure that there is a good strategy
map that respects the rule of Constant Necessitation. This is the task of the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.7. For each valuation set V , there is an axiomatically saturated strategy map
S that is good for V .
Proof. In this proof, a set is just a set of formulas. The conjunction of a finite set is the
conjunction whose conjuncts are the members of that finite set. Call a set consistent iff
no conjunction of a finite subset implies ⊥ in the theory LP. A set is inconsistent iff it
is not consistent. A set is called maximal consistent iff it is consistent and the addition
of any formula not already in the set would make the resulting set inconsistent. Using a
Lindenbaum argument, any consistent set may be extended to a maximal consistent set.
Let V ′ := V ∪{p ⊃ ⊥ | p /∈ V }. V ′ is consistent and so it may be extended to a maximal
consistent set T . Define a map W that takes each non-atom A to an immediate subformula
instance of A as follows:
W (B ⊃ C) :=
{
B if B /∈ T ,
C otherwise;
W (t :B) := B .
For each formula A, let A∗ be the strategy on A that follows W ; that is, for each choice
point B of A, set A∗(B) := W (B). Note that for each atom p, the strategy p∗ on p is just
the trivial strategy. Observe that if B is a choice point of the formula A, then A∗ B = B∗.
We now define a possible strategy map S: the domain of S consists of all term-formula
pairs (t, A) such that t :A ∈ T , and, for such a term-formula pair, we set S(t, A) := A∗. It
follows from the maximal consistency of T that S is axiomatically saturated.
We now show that S is in fact a strategy map.
1. Product. Suppose that S(u, A ⊃ B)↓ and S(v, A)↓.
(a) We show S(u · v, B) = S(u, A ⊃ B)B.
By definition of S, we have u : (A ⊃ B), v :A ∈ T and thus that (u · v) :B ∈ T by
LP1 and the maximal consistency of T . It follows from the definition of S that
S(u · v, B)↓ and, in particular, that S(u · v, B) = B∗. Since B is a choice point of
A ⊃ B, we have B∗ = (A ⊃ B)∗ B, where the right-hand side of this equation is
just S(u, A ⊃ B)B by our definition of S. The result follows.
(b) We show S(u, C ⊃ B)↓ and S(v, C)↓ implies S(u, C ⊃ B)B = S(u, A ⊃ B)B.
By the definition of S, we have S(u, C ⊃ B)  B = (C ⊃ B)∗  B and S(u, A ⊃
B) B = (A ⊃ B)∗ B. Since B is a choice point of both A ⊃ B and C ⊃ B, we
have B∗ = (A ⊃ B)∗ B and B∗ = (C ⊃ B)∗ B. The result follows.
2. Proof Checker. Suppose that S(t, A)↓.
By the definition of S, this means t :A ∈ T and thus !t : (t :A) ∈ T by LP2 and the
maximal consistency of T . Thus we have S(!t, t :A)↓ by our definition of S.
3. Sum.
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(a) We show S(t, A)↓ implies S(t + u, A) = S(t, A).
Suppose S(t, A)↓. By the definition of S, this means t :A ∈ T and thus (t + u) :A ∈
T by LP3 and the maximal consistency of T . It then follows from the definition
of S both that S(t + u, A) = A∗ and that S(t, A) = A∗, so the result follows.
(b) We show S(t, A)↑ and S(u, A)↓ implies S(t + u, A) = S(u, A).
This follows by an argument similar to the previous case.
So we have shown that S is indeed a strategy map.
What remains is to show that S is good for V . To prove this, we first assume what we
call the WS Property : A ∈ T implies A∗ is a winning strategy on A, and A /∈ T implies
there is a winning counter-strategy on A. We will prove the WS Property in a moment, but
let us first show that S is good for V . That is, we prove S(t, A)↓ implies that S(t, A) is a
winning strategy on A.
So suppose that S(t, A)↓. By our definition of S, it follows that t :A ∈ T and thus that
A ∈ T by LP4 and the maximal consistency of T . By the WS Property, it follows that A∗
is a winning strategy on A. By our definition of S, we have S(t, A) = A∗. We have thus
shown that S is good for V .
We now complete the proof by proving the WS Property: A ∈ T implies A∗ is a winning
strategy on A, and A /∈ T implies there is a winning counter-strategy on A. We prove this
by induction on the construction of A.
• Base case: A is an atom p.
– Suppose p ∈ T .
T was constructed as a maximal consistent extension of the set
V ′ := V ∪ {p ⊃ ⊥ | p /∈ V } ,
and so p ∈ T implies p ∈ V by the consistency of T . So p ∈ V , and thus the
trivial strategy p∗ is winning on p.
– Suppose p /∈ T .
Since T is a maximal consistent extension of V ′, we have that p /∈ T implies
p /∈ V . Thus the trivial counter-strategy is winning on p.
• Inductive case: A is the formula B ⊃ C.
– Suppose B ⊃ C ∈ T .
By the maximal consistency of T , we have that B /∈ T or C ∈ T . We handle each
case in turn.
∗ Case: B /∈ T .
By the inductive hypothesis, there is a winning counter-strategy B∗ on B.
By Claim 2(a)i of the proof of the Determinacy Lemma (Lemma 4.5) and the
definition of W , it follows that (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C.
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∗ Case: C ∈ T .
By the inductive hypothesis, C∗ is a winning strategy on C. By Claim 2(a)ii
of the proof of the Determinacy Lemma and the definition of W , it follows
that (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy on B ⊃ C.
– Suppose B ⊃ C /∈ T .
By the maximal consistency of T , we have that B ∈ T and that C /∈ T . By
the inductive hypothesis, B∗ is a winning strategy on B and there is a winning
counter-strategy C∗ on C. By Claim 2b of the proof of the Determinacy Lemma,
there is a winning counter-strategy on B ⊃ C.
• Inductive case: A is the formula t :B.
– Suppose t :B ∈ T .
By the LP4 and the maximal consistency of T , it follows that B ∈ T . Applying
the inductive hypothesis, B∗ is a winning strategy on T . By our definition of S,
we have S(t, B) = B∗. By Case 3a of the proof of the Determinacy Lemma and
the definition of W , it follows that (t :B)∗ is a winning strategy on t :B.
– Suppose t :B /∈ T .
By the definition of S, we have that S(t, B)↑. Applying Case 3c of the proof of
the Determinacy Lemma, there is a winning counter-strategy on t :B.
Finally, we may identify the true formulas as those for which there exists a winning
strategy in the LP Verification Game.
Definition 4.8 (Truth). Let V be a valuation set and A be a formula.
• A is true in V iff for every axiomatically saturated strategy map S that is good for V ,
there is a winning strategy on A.
• A is false in V iff A is not true in V .
To say a formula B is true means that B is true in every valuation set, and to say that B is
false means that B is not true.
The next lemma shows that our definition of truth is compositional in a Tarskian sense.
Lemma 4.9 (Compositionality Lemma). Let V be a valuation set.
1. An atom p is true in V iff p ∈ V .
2. An implication A ⊃ B is true in V iff A is false in V or B is true in V .
3. A term-labeled formula t :A is true in V iff for each axiomatically saturated strategy
map S that is good for V , we have that S(t, A)↓ and that S(t, A) is a winning strategy
on A.
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Proof. We prove each item in turn.
1. This was shown in the base case, Item 1, of the proof of the Determinacy Lemma
(Lemma 4.5).
2. The right-to-left direction is Claim 2a from the proof of the Determinacy Lemma. We
now argue the left-to-right direction. First, if it is not the case that A is false in V or
B is true in V , then it follows from the Determinacy Lemma and the Win-Loss Lemma
(Lemma 4.4) that A is true in V and B is false in V . Applying Claim 2b from the proof
of the Determinacy Lemma, A ⊃ B is false in V . By the Determinacy and Win-Loss
Lemmas, this is equivalent to saying that A ⊃ B is not true in V . This completes the
left-to-right direction.
3. The right-to-left direction is Case 3a from the proof of the Determinacy Lemma. The
left-to-right direction is Cases 3b and 3c from the proof of the Determinacy Lemma.
Finally, we show that our notion of truth exactly captures the provable LP formulas.
Theorem 4.10. The true formulas are exactly those formulas provable in LP.
Proof. If A is not provable in LP, then we may follow the proof of Theorem 4.7 to construct
a valuation set V and an axiomatically saturated strategy map S good for V such that A is
false in V . In particular, the non-provability of A implies that {A ⊃ ⊥} is consistent and so
this set may be extended to a maximal consistent set T . We then set V := {p | p ∈ T}. Given
this V and this T , the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.7 gives us an axiomatically
saturated strategy map good for V and, as A ⊃ ⊥ ∈ T and the maximal consistency of T
implies A /∈ T , the WS Property ensures that there is a winning counter-strategy on A.
So what remains is to show that each LP-provable formula is true. We do this by an
induction on the length of derivation in LP. Proceeding, let V be an arbitrary valuation set.
• Base case: each LP axiom is true.
– LP0. Classical propositional logic
We use the following axiomatization of classical propositional logic [8].
1. (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C))
2. A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
3. ((A ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ A
For each of the axioms, it follows from the Determinacy Lemma (Lemma 4.5)
that each of the subformula instances A, B, and C is itself true in V or false in V .
Note that the trivial counter-strategy is a winning strategy on ⊥, and therefore
⊥ is false. Applying the Compositionality Lemma (Lemma 4.9), it is easy to see
that each of these axioms is true in V .
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– LP1. t : (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (s :A ⊃ (t · s) :B)
By the Determinacy and Compositionality Lemmas, we may assume that t : (A ⊃ B)
and s :A are both true in V . Applying the Compositionality Lemma, if S is
an axiomatically saturated strategy map that is good for V , then we have that
S(t, A ⊃ B)↓, that S(s, A)↓, that S(t, A ⊃ B) is a winning strategy on A ⊃ B,
and that S(s, A) is a winning strategy on A. Were it the case that the value of
S(t, A ⊃ B) on A ⊃ B is the immediate subformula instance A of A ⊃ B, then
S(t, A ⊃ B)  A is a winning counter-strategy on A, and the Win-Loss Lemma
implies that this contradicts the fact that A has a winning strategy. Therefore
the value of S(t, A ⊃ B) on A ⊃ B is the immediate subformula instance B of
A ⊃ B, and so S(t, A ⊃ B)B is a winning strategy on B. The Product Property
of strategy maps ensures that S(t · s, B) = S(t, A ⊃ B)  B, so S(t · s, B) is a
winning strategy on B. Since S was an arbitrary axiomatically saturated strat-
egy map good for V , it follows from the Compositionality Lemma that (t · s) :B
is true in V . Applying the Compositionality Lemma again, LP1 is true in V .
– LP2. t :A ⊃ !t : (t :A)
By the Determinacy and Compositionality Lemmas, we may assume that t :A is
true in V . By the Compositionality Lemma, if S is an axiomatically saturated
strategy map that is good for V , then we have that S(t, A)↓ and that S(t, A) is
a winning strategy on A. The Proof Checker property of strategy maps ensures
that S(!t, t :A)↓, and so a play of t :A in accordance with S(!t, t :A) is just a play
of t :A. But if τ is a play of t :A, then τ  A is a play in accordance with the
winning strategy S(t, A) on A, so the end of τ  A is either a negative non-leaf
or else a leaf matching in A. Since A is a positive subformula instance of t :A
and τ was an arbitrary play of t :A in accordance with S(!t, t :A), it follows that
S(!t, t :A) is a winning strategy on t :A. Since S was an arbitrary axiomatically
saturated strategy map good for V , the Compositionality Lemma then implies
that !t : (t :A) is true in V . Applying the Compositionality Lemma again, LP2 is
true in V .
– LP3. t :A ⊃ (t + s) :A, t :A ⊃ (s + t) :A
We show only that the left LP3 axiom is true in V , the proof for the right LP3
axiom is similar. By the Determinacy and Compositionality Lemmas, we may
assume that t :A is true in V . If S is an axiomatically saturated strategy map good
for V , the Compositionality Lemma implies that S(t, A)↓ and that S(t, A) is a
winning strategy on A. Applying the Sum Property of strategy maps, S(t+s, A) =
S(t, A) and so S(t+s, A) is also a winning strategy on A. Since S was an arbitrary
axiomatically saturated strategy map good for V , the Compositionality Lemma
implies that (t + s) :A is true in V , so the Compositionality Lemma then implies
that LP4 is true in V .
– LP4. t :A ⊃ A
By the Determinacy and Compositionality Lemmas, we may assume that t :A
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is true in V . Applying the Compositionality Lemma, if S is an axiomatically
saturated strategy map good for V , then S(t, A)↓ and S(t, A) is a winning strategy
on A. A is thus true in V , and so it follows from the Compositionality Lemma
that LP4 is also true in V .
• Inductive case: truth is closed under the rule of Modus Ponens.
If A and A ⊃ B are both true in V , then it follows from the Compositionality Lemma,
the Win-Loss Lemma, and the Determinacy Lemma that B is true in V .
• Inductive case: truth is closed under the rule of Constant Necessitation.
Suppose that S is an axiomatically saturated strategy map good for V , that c is a
constant, and that A is an axiom. Since S is axiomatically saturated, we have that
S(c, A)↓, so it follows that S(c, A) is a winning strategy on A by our assumption that
S is good for V . Since the only choice point of c :A is the root of T (c :A) and S(c, A) is
a winning strategy on A, it then follows that the unique strategy on c :A is a winning
strategy on c :A. As S was an arbitrary axiomatically saturated strategy map good for
V , the Compositionality Lemma implies that c :A is true in V .
Since V was arbitrary, we have shown that each LP theorem is true.
5 Embeddings and the Internalization Theorem
The concept of extensive game with perfect information was introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [17]. Following some of Sevenster’s notation and naming conventions [16],
we define an extensive game with perfect information as a tuple G = (N, Σ,H, p, {ui}i∈N),
where
• N is a nonempty set whose elements are called players.
• Σ is a nonempty set.
• H is a nonempty prefix-closed set of strings over the alphabet Σ such that there is a
unique shortest string r in H. (r is typically the empty string ε.)
Members of H are called histories. A string h1 is a prefix of a string h iff there is a
string h2, which may be ε, such that h = h1h2. To say that H is prefix-closed means
that if h′ is a non-ε prefix of h and h ∈ H, then h′ ∈ H. A string h2 is a suffix of a
string h iff there is a string h1, which may be ε, such that h = h1h2. If h is a history,
a ∈ Σ, and ha is a history, then ha is called a move at h. Notation: Ht is the subset
of H containing all terminal histories, which are those histories h such that there is no
move at h. Also, Σ∗ is the set of all strings over the alphabet Σ, including ε.
• p is a function (H−Ht) → N that maps each non-terminal history to a player. To say
that the history h is a player i position means that p(h) = i.
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• ui is a function Ht → R that maps each terminal history to a payoff for player i.
G is called finite iff the sets N , Σ, and H are all finite. G is two-player iff N = {1, 2} and
p(r) = 1 if r /∈ Ht. If G is two-player, then G is win-loss exactly when for each h ∈ Ht,
we have that u1(h) = −u2(h) and that |u1(h)| = |u2(h)| = 1. All of the extensive games
with perfect information we discuss will be finite, two-player, and win-loss, so we make the
following definition.
Definition 5.1. A verification-like extensive game is an extensive game with perfect infor-
mation that is finite, two-player, and win-loss.
In verification-like extensive games, players take turns at each non-terminal history h,
with player p(h) choosing some move at h. Once a terminal history is reached, the game is
over, and the winner is the player whose payoff at that terminal history is 1; the other player
loses.
A strategy in a verification-like extensive game G is a function that maps each player 1
position h to a move at h. A history h is in accordance with a strategy s∗ iff for each player
1 position h′ such that h′ is a prefix of h with h′ 6= h, we have that s∗(h′) is also a prefix
of h. To say a strategy s∗ is winning means that for every terminal history h in accordance
with s∗, we have u1(h) = 1.
We define the notion of counter-strategy in G as we just did for a strategy in G, except
that the references to player 1 are all replaced by player 2. The meaning of a history
in accordance with a counter-strategy is given in the same way. A counter-strategy s∗ is
winning iff for every terminal history h in accordance with s∗, we have u1(h) 6= 1.
Since verification-like extensive games are finite, it follows from the Gale-Stewart The-
orem that each verification-like extensive game has either a winning strategy or a winning
counter-strategy (and not both).2
If we fix a formula A, a valuation set V , and an axiomatically saturated strategy map S
that is good for V , then the LP Verification Game on A with V and S may be viewed as a
verification-like extensive game. However, this statement is also true in the other direction.
Proposition 5.2. For each verification-like extensive game
G = (N, Σ,H, p, {ui}i∈N) ,
there is a formula A such that A is true iff there is a winning strategy in G.
Proof. This proof argues that the game tree of G can be faithfully represented by a formula
in the language of propositional logic. For transparency of the argument, we will perform
a few winning-strategy–preserving operations that modify G, allowing us to assume that G
is in a desirable form. To say that these operations are winning-strategy–preserving means
that there is a winning strategy on G iff there is a winning strategy on the verification-like
extensive game that results by applying these operations in order on G. We now describe
these operations and argue that each of them is winning-strategy–preserving.
2See Hodges’ exposition [10] of the Gale-Stewart Theorem [7].
18
• Collapse tails until each terminal history has a tail of length 1.
The tail of a terminal history h is the longest suffix h2 of h such that, if h = h1h2,
then for each non-ε prefix h′ of h2, there is at most one move to make at h1h
′. The
reason h2 is called a tail: ordering h2’s non-ε prefixes h
(1), h(2), h(3), . . . , h(n), h2 by





(3), . . . , h1h
(n), h1h2 ,
so this sequence traces out a tail-like path.
If ah2 is a tail of the terminal history h1ah2, with a ∈ Σ, then to collapse ah2 is to
define the verification-like extensive game
G′ = (N, Σ,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
– H′ := {h ∈ H | (∀h′ ∈ Σ∗)(h 6= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1a};
– p′(h) := p(h) if h ∈ H and h /∈ (Ht ∩H′t);
– u′i(h) :=
{
ui(h) if h ∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
ui(h1ah2) if h = h1a.
In G′, the tail a of terminal history h1a is of length 1. Further, a strategy s
∗ in G
induces a strategy s′∗ in G′ that takes each player 1 position h ∈ H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) := s∗(h) .
Since ah2 is the tail of h1ah2 in G, the terminal history h1ah2 in G is in accordance with
a strategy s∗ in G iff the terminal history h1a in G
′ is in accordance with the strategy
s′∗ in G′ induced by s∗. It follows that s∗ is a winning strategy in G iff s′∗ is a winning
strategy in G′. We may therefore collapse tails one by one until each terminal history
has a tail of length 1, after which we are assured that there is a winning strategy in
the resulting verification-like extensive game iff there was a winning strategy in the
original verification-like extensive game.
• Remove all only-child double-moves from G.
A double-move is a non-terminal history h′ that is a move at another history h with
p(h) = p(h′); h′ is said to be a double-move at h. A only-child double-move is a
double-move h′ at h such that h′ is the unique move at h. h′ is called an only-child
double-move because player p(h) has only the one move h′ at h and h′ is a double-move
at h.
An only-child double-move can be removed from the game G in the following way. First,
suppose h1a is an only-child double-move, where a ∈ Σ. We define the verification-like
extensive game
G′ = (N, Σ,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
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– H′ := {h ∈ H | (∀h′ ∈ Σ∗)(h 6= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1h′ | h1ah′ ∈ H};
– p′(h) :=
{
p(h) if h ∈ H and h /∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
p(h1ah





ui(h) if h ∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
ui(h1ah
′) if h = h1h
′ and h1ah
′ ∈ Ht.
G′ has one less only-child double-move than G does. Further, a strategy s∗ in G induces
a strategy s′∗ in G′ that takes each player 1 position h ∈ H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) :=
{
s∗(h) if h 6= h1,
h1h2 if h = h1h
′, h1ah
′ ∈ H, and s∗(h1ah′) = h1ah2.
Since h1a is an only-child double-move in G, a history h1ah
′ is in accordance with a
strategy s∗ in G iff the history h1h
′ is in accordance with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced
by s∗. It follows that s∗ is a winning strategy in G iff s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. So
we may remove all only-child double-moves from G in this way, one by one, and we are
assured the existence of a winning strategy in the resulting verification-like extensive
game iff there was a winning strategy in the original verification-like extensive game.
Since we removed only-child double-moves from G after collapsing tails until all tails
are of length 1, the verification-like extensive game resulting from these two operations
contains no only-child double-moves and has all its tails of length 1.
• Convert each three-plus fork to a two-fork.
A history h is called a three-plus fork iff there are at least three moves at h, and h is
called a two-fork iff there are exactly two moves at h. If h1a and h1b are both moves
at the three-plus fork h1, then we can reduce by one the number of moves at h1 by
defining the verification-like extensive game
G′ = (N, Σ′,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
– For some c /∈ Σ, let Σ′ := Σ ∪ {c};
– H′ := {h ∈ H | (∀h′ ∈ Σ∗)(h 6= h1ah′ and h 6= h1bh′)} ∪
{h1c} ∪
{h1cah′ | h1ah′ ∈ H} ∪
{h1cbh′ | h1bh′ ∈ H};
– p′(h) :=

p(h) if h ∈ H and h /∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
p(h1) if h = h1c,
p(h1ah









ui(h) if h ∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
ui(h1ah








There is one less move at history h1 in G
′ than there is at h1 in G. Further, a strategy




s∗(h) if s∗(h) 6= h1a and s∗(h) 6= h1b,
h1c if s
∗(h) = h1a or s
∗(h) = h1b,
h1ca if h = h1c and s
∗(h1) = h1a,
h1cb if h = h1c and s
∗(h1) = h1b,
h1cah2 if h = h1cah
′ and s∗(h1ah
′) = h1ah2,
h1cbh2 if h = h1cbh
′ and s∗(h1bh
′) = h1bh2.
It follows from the construction of G′ that the history h1cah
′ in G′ is in accordance
with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by a strategy s∗ in G iff the history h1ah
′ in G is
in accordance with s∗. The same result holds with respect to the history h1cbh
′ in G′
and the corresponding history h1bh
′ in G. We thus have that s∗ is a winning strategy
in G iff s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. So, by repeatedly performing this operation on
three-plus forks until no more three-plus forks remain, we produce a verification-like
extensive game in which there exists a winning strategy iff there was a winning strategy
in the original verification-like extensive game.
In performing this operation after the previous two, we made all tails of length 1,
we then removed all only-child double-moves, and we then incrementally reduced the
number of moves at three-plus forks until there were no more three-plus forks. The
resulting verification-like extensive game thus has tails all of length 1, contains no only-
child double-moves, and contains no three-plus forks. In fact, calling a history a fork iff
there are at least two moves at that history, every fork in the resulting verification-like
extensive game is a two-fork.
• Incrementally reduce the degree of each two-fork parity point until no two-fork is a
parity point.
A parity point is a history h1 such that there is a non-terminal move h2 at h1 satisfying
p(h2) 6= p(h1). h1 is called a parity point because the player-to-move can flip from
p(h1) to the other of the two players. The degree of a history h is equal to the number
of non-terminal moves h′ at h such that p(h′) 6= p(h). Thus a history of nonzero degree
is a parity point.
Assume that h1 is a two-fork parity point and that h1a is a non-terminal history with
p(h1a) 6= p(h1), where a ∈ Σ. We decrease by one the degree of h1 by adding a
double-move between h1 and h1a. To do this, we define the verification-like extensive
game
G′ = (N, Σ′,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
– For some b /∈ Σ, let Σ′ := Σ ∪ {b};
– H′ := {h ∈ H | (∀h′ ∈ Σ∗)(h 6= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1b} ∪




p(h) if h ∈ H and h /∈ (Ht ∩Ht),
p(h1) if h = h1b,
p(h1ah





ui(h) if h ∈ (Ht ∩H′t),
ui(h1ah
′) if h = h1bah
′ and h1ah
′ ∈ Ht.
The degree of h1 in G
′ is one less than the degree of h1 in G. Further, a strategy s
∗ in
G induces a strategy s′∗ in G′ that takes each player 1 position h ∈ H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) :=

s∗(h) if h ∈ H and h 6= h1,
h1b if h = h1,
h1ba if h = h1b,
h1bah2 if h = h1bah
′, h1ah
′ ∈ H, and s∗(h1ah′) = h1ah2.
It follows from our construction that the history h1bah
′ in G′ is in accordance with
the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by a strategy s∗ in G iff the history h1ah
′ in G is
in accordance with s∗. We thus have that s∗ is a winning strategy in G iff s′∗ is a
winning strategy in G′. Proceeding in this way, we incrementally reduce the degree of
each two-fork parity point until there are no more two-fork parity points, and we are
assured that the resulting verification-like extensive game has a winning strategy iff
the original extensive game had a winning strategy. Notice that since we only perform
this operation at two-fork parity points, we never introduce only-child double-moves.
So after performing the operations above in order, we end up with a verification-like extensive
game satisfying each of the following properties:
1. every fork is a two-fork,
2. every terminal history is a move at a two-fork (because all tails are of length 1),
3. no two-fork is a parity point, and
4. there are no only-child double-moves.
We may thus assume without loss of generality that G satisfies each of these properties.
We now proceed with our construction of the formula A, the formula in the statement
of this proposition. First, call a terminal history positive in G iff it has an even number of
ancestors that are parity points; call a terminal history is negative G iff it is not positive in
G. Working our way backward from terminal histories, we define a function f that takes
each history h to a formula f(h) according to the following case analysis.
• If h is a positive terminal history, then
f(h) :=
{
> if u1(h) = 1,
⊥ if u1(h) 6= 1.
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• If h is a negative terminal history, then
f(h) :=
{
⊥ if u1(h) = 1,
> if u1(h) 6= 1.
• If h is a parity point (and hence non-terminal), then
f(h) := ¬f(h′) ,
where h′ is the unique move at h (uniqueness follows from Properties 1 and 3).
• If h is neither a parity point nor a terminal history, then
f(h) := f(h1) ∨ f(h2) ,
where h1 and h2 are the two moves at h. To see why there are exactly two moves at h,
first notice that there is a move h1 at h because h is non-terminal. Next observe that
h1 is a double-move because h is not a parity point. But Property 4 implies that h1
cannot be an only-child double-move, so h is a fork. Applying Property 1, it follows
that h is in fact a two-fork.
In this way, f maps each history to a formula, and we let the formula A in the statement of
this proposition be the formula f(r), where r is the unique shortest string in H.
A is in the language of propositional logic and, further, it is letterless, meaning that each
atomic formula appearing in A is a propositional constant. It thus follows that the winning
(counter-)strategy on A in LP Verification is independent of any valuation set V and any
axiomatically saturated strategy map S good for V . So, in fact, we do not need any of the
special features of LP Verification—Propositional Verification will do—but we will need LP
Verification later when we apply the Internalization Theorem, so we will nonetheless use LP
Verification. What remains is to show that A is true iff there is a winning strategy in G.
For the moment, it will be convenient to assume that the language of propositional logic
contains the symbol ¬ for negation and ∨ for disjunction and that formula formation (for
propositional and LP formulas) is closed both under forming the negation ¬B of a formula
B and under forming the disjunction B ∨ C of two formulas B and C. The construction
tree T (B) of an LP formula B is then built using the rules from before in addition to the
following rules: a node labeled ¬C has the left child C, and a node labeled C ∨ D has the
right child C and the further-right child D. (The terminology “further-right” comes from
the fact that we do not want to change our definition of positive subformula instance: a
subformula instance C of B is positive iff the path in T (B) ending on C contains the left
child of an even number of nodes.) That the work of the previous sections can be carried out
in a language that also has negations and disjunctions ought to be apparent, so we proceed,
letting T (A) be the construction tree for our formula A in this larger language.
We now argue that f is a tree-isomorphism between H and T (A), by which we mean
that three conditions are satisfied. We list each condition along with an argument as to why
that condition is true.
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1. f(r) = A, where r is the unique shortest string in H.
This condition is satisfied by our definition of A.
2. If h′ is a move at h, then f(h′) is an immediate subformula instance of f(h).
This follows by inspection of the way we defined f on each history h.
3. If B is an immediate subformula instance of f(h), then there is a move h′ at h such
that f(h′) = B.
By our definition of f , that the formula f(h) has immediate subformula instances
implies that f(h) is either a disjunction or a negation. If f(h) is a disjunction, then
f(h) was defined by forming the disjunction of the formulas f(h1) and f(h2), where
h1 and h2 are moves at h. If f(h) is a negation, then f(h) was defined by forming the
negation of the formula f(h3), where h3 is the unique move at h. So in either case,
we have for each immediate subformula instance B of f(h) a move h′ at h such that
f(h′) = B.
We may thus view f as a bijection between histories and subformula instances of A, so it
makes sense to talk of the history f−1(B) obtained as the inverse image of f on the subformula
instance B of A. It follows that terminal histories are in one-to-one correspondence with
leaves of T (A). Observe that for an immediate subformula instance C of a subformula
instance B of A, we have that B and C are of opposite polarity only if f−1(B) is a parity
point. We therefore have that an atomic subformula instance p of A is positive in A iff
f−1(p) is positive in G. Looking back to how we specified the leaves in T (A) as images of
terminal histories, it then follows that that player 1 wins at terminal history h in G iff the
first player (“True”) wins the play of A ending on f(h) in the LP Verification Game on A. It
then follows immediately that there is a winning strategy in G iff there is a winning strategy
on A. Since A is letterless, it follows that there is a winning strategy in G iff A is true.
So the proof of Proposition 5.2 defines a winning-strategy–preserving embedding that
maps each verification-like extensive game G to a letterless propositional formula AG. Now
let us assume for a moment that there is a winning strategy in G, and so AG is true and
hence provable in LP. Applying the Internalization Theorem (Theorem 2.3), there is a term
t containing no variables such that t :AG is also a theorem of LP. We now show how the
inductive construction of t in the proof of the Internalization Theorem tells us how to build
a winning strategy A∗G on AG, which we may view as the interpretation of t in the LP
Verification Game.
• Suppose we used a constant c to internalize the axiom A.
We proved in Theorem 4.7 that each axiom has a winning strategy, so choose a winning
strategy A∗ on A (any will do). Take A∗ as the interpretation of c.
• Suppose we used the term u · v to internalize the conclusion B obtained from Modus
Ponens on B and C ⊃ B, where we already constructed terms u and v such that both
u : (C ⊃ B) and v :B are theorems.
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We have already determined a winning strategy B∗ on B that interprets v and a winning
strategy (C ⊃ B)∗ on C ⊃ B that interprets u. It follows from the Compositionality
Lemma (Lemma 4.9) that (C ⊃ B)∗ B is a winning strategy on B, so take (C ⊃ B)∗ 
B as the interpretation of u · v.
• Suppose we used the term !c to internalize the conclusion c :A obtained from Constant
Necessitation on the axiom A.
We have already determined a winning strategy A∗ on A interpreting c. But notice
that there is then only one winning strategy (c :A)∗ on c :A because the only choice
point of c :A is the root of T (c :A). So (c :A)∗ simply maps c :A to the immediate
subformula instance A. Let this strategy interpret !c.
In this way, we obtain a winning strategy A∗G on AG that interprets t. However, since the
game tree of G is essentially the same as the LP Verification game tree on AG, the winning
strategy A∗G induces a winning strategy s
∗ on G. Here the word “essentially” is used to
indicate that we manipulated G during the proof of Proposition 5.2 in our construction of
AG; however, these manipulations are invertible, which allows us to convert the winning
strategy on the manipulated G to a winning strategy on the original, non-manipulated G.
In this way, the Internalization Theorem provides a means of constructing winning strategies
on winnable instances of verification-like extensive games.
5.1 Example: Obtaining Winning Strategies in Nim
The well-known game of Nim [5] may be viewed as a verification-like extensive game. The
initial setup for a play of Nim consists of three separate piles of stones, each pile being of
finite size. A move consists of selecting one pile and then removing any nonzero number
of stones from that pile, leaving the other two piles alone. The removed stones are then
discarded, as they are no longer part of the game. Two players take alternate turns moving
in this way until all stones are removed. The player that picks up the last stone is the winner,
and so the player that has no stone to pick up is the loser.
We represent a Nim instance as a triple (a, b, c) of non-negative integers. The Nim in-
stance (a′, b′, c′) stands in one-move relation to the Nim instance (a, b, c), written (a, b, c) →1
(a′, b′, c′), iff the primed triple is obtained from the unprimed triple by one legal move in
the Nim game. Notice that no Nim instance stands in one-move relation to (0, 0, 0) because
(0, 0, 0) marks the end of every play of Nim. We write (a, b, c) →∗ (a′, b′, c′) iff the Nim in-
stance (a′, b′, c′) may be obtained from the Nim instance (a, b, c) by zero or more legal moves
in the Nim game, so →∗ is just the reflexive-transitive closure of →1. A Nim instance (a, b, c)
may be viewed as the verification-like extensive game G(a, b, c) = (N, Σ,H, p, {ui}i∈N), where
the components of this tuple are given as follows.
• N := {1, 2}.
• Σ := {(a′, b′, c′) | (a, b, c) →∗ (a′, b′, c′)}.
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• H is defined as follows. First, set H0 := {(a, b, c)}. Once Hk is defined, define Hk+1 as
the set
{h(a1, b1, c1)(a′, b′, c′) | h(a1, b1, c1) ∈ Hk and (a1, b1, c1) →1 (a′, b′, c′)} ,
where h is a metavariable ranging over Σ∗. Finally, let H :=
⋃a+b+c
i=0 Hi.
• p is defined as follows. For each history h, define the length of h as the number of
elements of Σ contained in h. Example: in G(2, 1, 0), the non-terminal history
(2, 1, 0)(1, 1, 0)(1, 0, 0)
has length three. Now if h is a non-terminal history, then set p(h) := 1 if the length of
h is odd; otherwise, if the length of h is even, then set p(h) := 2.
• u1 is defined as follows. For each terminal history h, set u1(h) := 1 if the length of h
is even; set u1(h) := −1 if the length of h is odd.
• u2 is defined as follows. For each terminal history h, set u2(h) := 1 if the length of h
is odd; set u2(h) := −1 if the length of h is even.
Now that we have seen how a Nim instance may be viewed as a verification-like extensive
game, we will work out an example that shows how to use the Internalization Theorem to
construct a winning strategy on the winnable Nim instance (2, 1, 0).
First observe that player 1 can guarantee himself a win in G(2, 1, 0) iff his move at the
history (2, 1, 0) is (2, 1, 0)(1, 1, 0). This move corresponds to the first player picking up one
stone from the first pile. The second player then picks up one stone from either of the first
or second piles, leaving the first player to pick up the last stone for the win.
So there is indeed a winning strategy in G(2, 1, 0). We will now embed G(2, 1, 0) into
the LP Verification Game according to the construction in the proof of Proposition 5.2. We
will then see how the Internalization Theorem allows us to extract the winning strategy in
G(2, 1, 0). Initially, G(2, 1, 0) has the form of the tree in Figure 2. We then perform in order
the operations on G(2, 1, 0) described in the proof of Proposition 5.2. (As we proceed, we
will use the terminology from this proof, though we also restate the definitions of the most
important terminology. The reader may find it convenient to keep track of where we are
in the bulleted list at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 5.2, which itemizes these
operations in order and provides formal definitions of the terminology.)
The first operation calls for us to collapse tails until each terminal history’s tail is of
length 1. The result of this operation is the tree in Figure 3.
The next operation calls for us to remove each only-child double-move; however, the tree
in Figure 3 does not have only-child double-moves, so this operation causes no change in the
tree. Moving to the next operation, we are called to convert three-plus forks to two-forks.
The result of this operation is the tree in Figure 4.
The next operation calls for us to ensure that no two-fork is a parity point. The result
of this operation is the tree in Figure 5.
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(1, 0, 0) T
(0, 0, 0) XT
(0, 0, 0) XF
(0, 1, 0) F
(0, 0, 0) XF









(1, 0, 0) T
(0, 0, 0) XT
(0, 1, 0) T
(0, 0, 0) XT
Figure 2. A tree representing G(2, 1, 0). Positions at which the first player moves are marked by a T and
positions at which the second player moves are marked by an F . The winning states for the first player are
marked by the symbol XT and the winning states for the second player are marked by the symbol XF .


































(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XF









(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XT
Figure 3. The tree of Figure 2 after tails are collapsed to length 1. (Here a tail is path that proceeds
upward from a leaf and that is of maximal length subject to the restriction that no node appearing in the
path has more than one child.)









































(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XF
(0, 0, 0) XF









(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XT
Figure 4. This tree results from converting three-plus forks to two-forks in the tree of Figure 3. To complete
this operation, we introduced a redundant node southwest of the root of the tree in Figure 3. (Here a fork
is a node with more than one child, a three-plus fork is a fork with at least three children, and a two-fork is
a fork with exactly two children.)
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(2, 1, 0) T









(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XF
(0, 0, 0) XF
(2, 1, 0) T









(0, 0, 0) XT (0, 0, 0) XT
Figure 5. This tree results from introducing double-moves into the tree of Figure 4 so that no two-fork is a
parity point. To complete this operation, we introduced one double-move southeast of the root and another
double-move southwest of the southernmost (2, 1, 0) position. (Here a double-move is a node whose parent
has the same player-to-play, and a parity point is a node with a non-leaf child at which the player-to-play
differs.)























Figure 6. The formula construction tree of AG(2,1,0), a construction tree created from the tree in Figure 5
according to the proof of Proposition 5.2.
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In Figure 5, we have that every fork is a two-fork, that every terminal history is a move
at a two-fork, that no two-fork is a parity point, and that there are no only-child double-
moves. We are led to the formula construction in Figure 6 by the construction in the proof
of Proposition 5.2.
The formula at the root of the Figure 6 construction tree is the formula AG(2,1,0). This
formula is a theorem of propositional logic (and hence of LP). Here is a proof of AG(2,1,0).
1. ⊥ ⊃ ⊥
by Axiom ⊥ ⊃ A
2. (⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ (⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
by Axiom (A ⊃ C) ⊃ ((B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ∨B ⊃ C))
3. ⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥
by Modus Ponens 1,2
4. (⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥)
by Axiom (A ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬A
5. ¬(⊥ ∨⊥)
by Modus Ponens 3,4
6. ¬(⊥ ∨⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥ ∨>) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥))
by Axiom A ⊃ B ∨ A
7. (¬(⊥ ∨>) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥)
by Modus Ponens 5,6
Here is the above proof internalized in LP.
1. a : (⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
2. b : ((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ (⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥))
3. ((b · a) · a) : (⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
4. c : ((⊥ ∨⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥))
5. (c · ((b · a) · a)) : (¬(⊥ ∨⊥))
6. d : (¬(⊥ ∨⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥ ∨>) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥)))
7. (d · (c · ((b · a) · a))) : ((¬(⊥ ∨>) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨⊥))
To determine the winning strategy described by the term d · (c · ((b · a) · a)), it suffices to
determine the winning strategy described by d on the axiom it labels in line 6. This strategy
is given as follows:
• Map ¬(⊥∨⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥∨>)∨⊥)∨¬(⊥∨⊥)) to its consequent, which is the formula
AG(2,1,0).
• Map AG(2,1,0) to its immediate subformula instance ¬(⊥ ∨⊥).
• Map ¬(⊥ ∨⊥) to its immediate subformula instance ⊥ ∨⊥.
And so the strategy on AG(2,1,0) described by d · (c · ((b · a) · a)) consists of the strategy d
restricted to its consequent AG(2,1,0), a strategy consisting of just the last two of the three
bullets above. This strategy on AG(2,1,0) specifies a strategy on the tree in Figure 5, which
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induces the strategy “at (2, 1, 0), choose (1, 1, 0)” on the tree in Figure 4. The strategy on
the tree in Figure 4 then induces the same strategy on the tree of Figure 3. And the strategy
on the tree of Figure 3 induces the following strategy on the tree of Figure 2:
• “At (2, 1, 0), choose (1, 1, 0).”
• “At (1, 0, 0), choose (0, 0, 0).”
• “At (0, 1, 0), choose (0, 0, 0).”
We see immediately that this is indeed a winning strategy in G(2, 1, 0). And as we had
hoped, this strategy on the tree of Figure 2 corresponds to the following strategy for the
Nim instance (2, 1, 0): “remove one stone from the first pile, wait for the other player to
respond, and then remove the remaining stone.”
6 Conclusion
We have defined a game semantics for LP in which terms are interpreted as winning strategies
on the formulas they label. This interpretation allows us to view LP as a logic of explicit
strategies for its own verification game. Of particular interest is the Internalization Theorem
(Theorem 2.3), which we may read as asserting that LP describes a winning strategy on each
of its theorems. Notice that there is no requirement for LP to be complete with respect to
the class of winning strategies in its verification game (meaning that for a fixed valuation set
V and axiomatically saturated strategy map S that is good for V , if s∗ is a winning strategy
on a formula A, then there is a term t such that S(t, A) = s∗).
It may be of interest to determine how such strategic completeness can be imposed,
whether semantically (perhaps a trivial matter of definition) or syntactically (via a language
extension). Of course, such an imposition ought not disturb the Internalization Theorem,
since it is this theorem that lets us exploit the winning-strategy–preserving embedding of
verification-like extensive games into LP Verification in order to construct winning strategies
on winnable instances of verification-like extensive games. (We showed how this is done for
the Nim instance (2, 1, 0).)
But it might be the case that strategic incompleteness is of greater interest. In particular,
by carefully managing those winning strategies that terms may and may not express—
something we might call strategic expressivity—our LP Verification Game might be extended
to the various (multi-)modal extensions of LP [2, 3, 1]. This extension would have a player
who is to make a move at the modal formula 2A choose a term t and then continue playing
as if the current formula were t :A. Thus the set
{s∗ | (∃t)(S(t, A)↓ and S(t, A) = s∗)}
of strategies on A expressible by a term would determine the modal theory for the modality
2. Such a study of term expressivity seems promising as a direction for research aimed at
defining a game semantics for all of Justification Logic [2, 3, 1].
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